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Progress Derailed
The Legal Status of Women in Pakistan
By Nan Berezowski
Riding a religious roner coaster
LePakistan a dij(lite considere comme l' un des Etats musulmans
les plus progressistes. En 1948. la delegation pakistanaise aux
Nations unies afait sienne l'ideologie qui sous-tend les normes
edictees par la declaration universelle des droit humains et s'est
aussi montree determiner ales appliquer au Pakistan. Dans ce
contexte. le mouvement des femmes a pu realiser des gains
significatifs. Mais les personnes qui ont luttepour transformer le
Pakistan en une dimocratie moderne ontsous-estimel' importance
de la reapparition du fondamentalisme musulman. Les
fondamentalistes ont pris le dessus en se ralliant le soutien
populaire. Avantd' essayerde demander des rejormesjuridiques,
le mouvement des femmes doit cultiver le soutien de la popula-
tion.llluifaut tenir un langage modhe afin de susciter l'interet
d' une plus vaste frange de la societe pakistanaise.
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The 1988 election ofBenazirBhuttogave many Pakistani women
hope that the rising popularity of Islamic fundamentalism would
subside. After all, one of Benazir's campaign promises was to
dismantle the Hudood Ordinances, a setofstringent Islamic laws
introduced in 1979 by her predecessor, Zia-ul-haq. Under these
laws for a woman to prove she has been raped she must provide
witnesses to the penetration. If she fails to prove the rape, she in
turn risks being charged with adultery. (Stackhouse, 19913: 16)
However, Benazir's government was short-lived, its promises
remained unfulfilled, and its downfall was shrouded in contro-
versy. With its defeat, women's rights advocates had to relin-
quish hope that speedy improvements in the legal status of
women would emanate from the legislature.
Under Main Nawaz Sharif, head of the Islamic Democratic
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Alliance, the process of Islamization has resumed. His govern-
ment's erratic attempts to make Pakistani institutions and society
congruent with Shariah. the traditional soda-religious law of
Islam, have resulted in virtual chaos. Banking is butone example:
economists warn that if all forms of interest paid or charged by
fmancial institutions are banned because they are incongruent
with Shariah. as the Federal Shariat Court has proclaimed, the
nation's entire financial system will be jeopardized. (Hussain
23b) As for Pakistani women, strict adherence to Shariah means
that they may be legally forced to wear the veil, they may lose the
delegated right to divorce, be unable to bar their husbands from
taking new wives, and the repeal of the Ordinances will become
next to impossible. Pakistan was once considered a testament to
moderate Islam, a country where the status of women would,
albeit slowly, become congruent with international human rights
standards. What accounts for this turnabout? How can it be
rectified?
A matter of interpretation
Like other leaders, those of Islamic states have seldom offi-
cially denied that their states are subject to the basic obligations
of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). Instead, they deny alleged violations,
denounce the intrusion into sovereign affairs, or plead emer-
gency. Such behaviour implies an ideological acceptance of
international standards despite a lack ofresources orpolitical will
to comply with them. However, some have argued that the very
nature ofIslam makes it unrealistic, or wrong, to hold these states
to international human rights standards that express Western
values alien to Islamic societies. This attitude reflects an ideo-
logical rejection ofboth the standards and the assertion that they
are universal.
It is hardly surprising that during the course of debate at the
United Nations on the text of the UDHR, adopted in 1948, as "a
common standard ofachievement for all peoples and nations," a
difference ofopinion among the Muslim delegates emerged as to
the implications for Shariah. (UDHR preamble) Saudi and Egyp-
tian delegates expressed reservations as to the universality of the
UDHR'S philosophical and political assumptions and considered
some of them incompatible. (Sajoo 25) However, speaking on
behalf of Pakistan, Mohammed Zafrullah Khan told the United
Nations that Islam not only recognized, but advocated the con-
cept ofhuman rights. From his perspective, the aspirations of the
UDHR reflected the lessons ofhistory and teachings ofall religions
and thus were the legacy of all human experience. (Sajoo 28-29)
The ease with which Pakistan accepted the UDHR as complemen-
tary to Islam can be traced to the modernist interpretation of
Shariah that prevailed among the nation's political elite at the
time. The opposing perspective is a manifestation of classical
interpretation.
Traditionally, Islam emphasizes community well-being as
opposed to individual rights. (Sajoo 29) Like other religious
systems of law, according to classical interpretation, "rights" are
the corollaries of duties owed to Allah and to other individuals.
(Arzt 205; Raft, 1992) For the Muslim is not the autonomous
individual of Western philosophy, but one who submits to the
will of Allah. Therefore, the only rights that are "unalienable," as
in the Western conceptof"natural rights," are those belonging to
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Allah and the state, Allah's servant. (Mayer 1023) Consistent
with the view that individual and statearenot normallyadversarial
is the absence of governmental checks and balances that most
Western countries see as basic to the guarantee of human rights
in Islamic legal tradition. As a result, Classical interpretation
evolved as fundamentally opposed to an independent judiciary
thatcoulddefine limits ofthe state. Furthermore,becauseShariah
is divine law, the only need for human agency was fulfilled long
ago when the religious jurists conclusively determined the true
meaning of the Scriptures. (Collins 522-523) Shariah is thus
frozen in time.
The classicist emphasis on duties over rights, on community
over individual, and the absence ofchecks and balances provides
a weak platform upon which to assert human rights. Furthermore,
the inherent rejection of change favours the maintenance of a
status quo that denies women and non-Muslims full legal status.
As a result, classical interpretation has had little appeal to
women's rights advocates, who in turn have formed an early
alliance with the modernists.
Modernist interpretation loosely describes three alternatives to
the classical interpretation of Shariah. The "moderate" view
provides that declarations of rights in an Islamic state must, and
can, be drawn from Islamic jurisprudence. When scriptural
sources support international human rights standards they can be
advocated without jeopardizing religious integrity. The "secu-
lar" view argues that modem states are by their very nature
secular, and must be ruled by secular law. This view is problem-
atic as it pertains to women because "private" family matters are
often characterized as an exception. The "radical" view main-
tains that Shariah is neither sacred nor relevant to contemporary
Islamic society. In this view, Shariah is not divine law, but rather
derived by mortals from religious sources, and therefore inevita-
bly influenced by circumstances, knowledge, and customs. Inter-
national human rights standards are entirely consistent with the
principles of Islam because they reflect the essential values
preached by the Prophet. (Hanavar 365; An-Na'im 491) Al-
though the three are conceptually distinct, there is a tendency
among modernists to blur these differences so as to promote
specific goals most effectively. For example, politicians and
women's rights advocates sympathetic to the "radical" view may
profess a "moderate" view so as to make their ideas more
acceptable to the majority of people.
In May 1991, the National Assembly adopted Shariah as the
country's supreme law by passing the controversial Shariat Act.
The interpretation ofShariah has always been an important issue
for Pakistani women, because Islam, and more specifically the
application of Shariah. is the primary means by which women's
human rights are denied or curtailed. It is subsequently more
crucial than ever. (Mumtaz and Shaheed) As such, the status of
women is caught in the middle of an ongoing debate of political
and legal ideology regarding the role of religion in contemporary
Pakistani society.
A history of conflict
British rule in Muslim India had a profound impact on the
development of modernist interpretation of Islamic legal theory.
Instrumental in the movement was Sir Syed Ahmand Khan who
first fostered support for a program of educational and religious
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The status of women is caught in the middle ofan ongoing debate
reform. Khan borrowed from Western
ideas what he considered worthwhile and
cooperated with the British as a means of
improving the lot and influence of Mus-
lims, who were outnumbered on the sub-
continent by Hindus four to one. (Collins
525; Mumtaz and Shaheed 7) A growing
number of upper-class Muslims joined
him in rejecting the stagnancy ofclassical
interpretation and began advocating that
the Quran be interpreted in light of con-
temporary circumstances. Theyembraced
the "radical" view, for their objective was
to employ the basic principles of the
Quran, justiceand fairness, to effect wide-
spread political and legal reform. In 1906,
members ofthis Western-educated landed
elite formed the All Muslim League,
which eventually brought about the Inde-
pendent State of Pakistan. (Mumtaz and
Shaheed 7)
Women's rights advocates were part of
the early modernist movement. Among
the first was Sir Mohammed Shafi who
returned from England in 1892 and set
about promoting women's education. Pa-
kistan's first women's organization, the
Anjuman-e-Khawteen-e-Islam. was
founded in 1908 in his house; itadvocated
abandoning the veil, an end to the dowry
system, and that women be given their
share of inheritance as stipulated in the
Quran. Although working within the
framework of Islam, their mandate was
nonetheless considered extreme. Yet they
received some support from others of the
Western-educated upper-class. (Mumtaz
and Shaheed 41) Thus, through its early
association with the eventual founders of
Pakistan, the women's movement was an
integral participant in the establishment
of a Muslim political entity on the Indian
subcontinent.
In 1947, the modernists succeeded in
partitioning Pakistan from India. Ironi-
cally, Pakistan was created because of
religion: Muslims who feared prosecu-
tion in a Hindu-dominated India sought
separation to preserve their Islamic iden-
tity, yet its modernist founders did not
envision a theocracy.
For Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the na-
tion's first prime minister, the Muslim
community was not defined by the single
dimension of religion, but rather by a
combinationof"all thevarious elements-
religion, culture, race, language, art, mu-
sic and so forth." (Collins 557-560) He,
and other modernists, setaboutbuilding a
nation that reflected a broad interpreta-
tion ofShariah. one that would permit the
flexibility demanded by a modern democ-
racy. During the early years, the modern-
ist domination of the legislature and sub-
sequent staffmg of the courts and bu-
reaucracy with similar-minded people
made it appear that Jinnah's secular vi-
sion would become reality.
In this era, the most significant and
controversial reform specifically pertain-
ing to women was the 1961 Muslim Fam-
ily Laws Ordinance. It aimed to discour-
age polygamy and to regulate divorce by
prescribing procedures for both. For ex-
ample, the Ordinance stipulated that for a
man to have multiple wives, he would
now be obliged to obtain the consent of
his existing wife or wives. (Article 6(2))
The Ordinance also eliminated Talaq, the
customary and much abused practice
whereby a man could repudiate his mar-
riage by repeating the word Talaq three
times, and it provided for taleq-e-tawid,
the delegated right of the wife to divorce.
(Articles 7(1) and 8) As well, it provided
for divorce by mutual consent, and raised
the marriage age for girls from 14 to 16
years of age. (Article 8)
The Ordinance was both a real and
symbolic victory for Pakistani women,
for it exemplified the prevalence of the
modernist interpretation of Shariah over
the classic. The 1956 Commission on
Marriage and Family Laws, which pro-
vided the impetus for the legislative bat-
tle, clearly articulated the modernist posi-
tion: the Quran embodied "basic princi-
ples" that mustbeapplied afresh tochang-
ing conditions. For example, it argued
that the practice of polygamy no longer
served its historical purpose, which was
to provide support for widows (and their
children) by allowing them to marry a
man who already had a wife. Further-
more, it argued that contemporary prac-
tice ignored the Quranic condition that all
wives receive equal treatment, and inter-
preted it as requiring that second mar-
riages be granted only if the court was
persuaded that "no injustice" would be
done to the frrst wife. (Collins 547) In this
manner, women like Begum Jahan Shah-
Nawaz, who led the legislative battle,
wereable to erode theclassical constraints
to women's rights in marriage. (Shah-
Nawaz)
The Ordinance was attacked by con-
servative forces: the Ulema (religious
scholars) and the Mulvi (unofficialpreach-
ers) dismissed it as un-Islamic. TheMulvi
insisted that it was not possible to deter
men from multiple marriages, as this was
sanctioned by Islam. As such, the Ordi-
nanceencouraged men to take mistresses.
(Mumtaz and Shaheed 60) In response,
the Ulema and, more vocally, the Mulvi
stepped up their continued effort to rally
the masses in favour ofcomplete enforce-
ment of Shariah in accordance with clas-
sical interpretation.
The power of Islam to rally the people
proved irresistible to the modernist politi-
cians as well. For example, despite his
secular vision, much of Jinnah's image
had a religious flavour. He was even pro-
claimed "the servant of God." (Collins
547) Like those who followed him,Jinnah
felt it necessary to cloak the tenets of
liberal democracy in Islamic language so
as to maintain unity among the people
who were divided by ethnicity, language,
and class. This political strategy contin-
ued in the Ayub Khan era and reached
new heights duringZulfiquar Ali Bhutto's
term in office. l Bhutto's "Islamic Social-
ism" not surprisingly lent credence to the
Ulema's heightened charges of hypoc-
risy. (Collins 563) However, these were
turbulent times: in East Pakistan there
was civil war and ultimately separation,
and elsewhere democracy remained tenu-
ous-the military becoming an increas-
ing threat. Islamic rhetoric seemed the
mosteffective meansofmaintaining unity
and control in the midst of chaos.
Despite the politicians' rhetoric, until
General Zia-ul-Haq's military coup in
1977, the main corpus of law inherited
from the British remained largely intact.
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regarding the role ofreligion in contemporary Pakistani society.
Furthermore, the modernists, who domi-
nated the courts, continued to function as
the British Indian courts had by using the
common law method to gradually under-
mine any of the Islamic law they pur-
ported to apply. In other words, even if
courts were hesitant to evoke their own
interpretation of the Quran, they would
look to common law precedent, substitut-
ing an earlier judge's interpretation for
that of the ancient religious scholars.
Rashida Begum v. Shahib Din, where the
brother ofa deceased and divorced father
sought to enforce the father's automatic
right to custody ofhis son after age seven,
and daughter after puberty, went beyond
this. The court directly interpreted the
Quran to find in favour of the mother.
(1142) In doing so, it rejected the estab-
lished religious rule, saying that the Quran
provided only "broad and general rules"
in order to allow flexibility in changing
circumstances. (1150)
Such decisions fueled fundamentalist
dissent and heightened support for the
increasingly vocal Mu/vi. Meanwhile, in
addition to the modernist legacy of em-
ploying Islamic rhetoric and symbolism
to promote political goals, the practice of
making concessions to the U/ema and
Mulvi intensified. For example, in 1973,
Bhutto agreed to declare Pakistan an Is-
lamic Republic. Bhutto, who inducted
women into all branches of the civil serv-
ice and did not oppose social drinking,
declared the Ahmadiya minority non-
Muslim and banned liquor under funda-
mentalist pressure. (Rafi, 1990: 18) Al-
though concessions may have had short
term strategic advantages, they inevitably
eroded the power and influence of the
modernists who made them. As forBhutto,
Islamic consciousness ran counter to his
party's progressive platform and contrib-
uted to his demise.2 Improvements in the
legal status of women would become an-
other casuality.
GeneralZia'smilitary takeoverabruptly
changed Pakistan's history of de facto
secularism at the hands of the modernists.
Zia insisted that restructuring Pakistani
society in accordance with Islamic ideol-
ogy would rid the nation of its economic,
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political, and social problems. The legal
aspect of his Islamization program in-
cluded the reinstatement of an Islamic
penal code through the 1979 Hudood Or-
dinance and changes in the laws of evi-
dence so that a woman's testimony in
court was now worth half that of a man's.
(Mumtaz and Shaheed 99-122) His
changes closely paralleled the classical
interpretation of Shariah.
However, the judiciary was slow to
follow Zia's lead, and surprisingly he
seemed unconcerned. For Zia too was
employing the power of Islamic rhetoric
to serve his political agenda-to legiti-
mize and consolidate his own authority.
He justifiedpostponementofelections on
the grounds that the Islamization process
had not yet proceeded sufficiently, and
co-opted conservative support in the leg-
islature through his promise of
Islamization.
Eventually, the slow pace of
Islamizationbegan todisplease the Ulema,
and in July 1985, the fundamentalist party,
lama' at-i-lslami, introduced the Shariat
Bill. (Collins 577)Butbefore itwaspassed
into law, Zia died suddenly in a plane
crash and Benazir Bhutto, leading the
Pakistan People's Party, was democrati-
cally elected prime minister. At first
glance, the subsequent promulgation of
the Shariat Bill can be attributed to the
simple fact that Benazir's government
lacked the two-thirds majority in the Na-
tional Assembly required to prevent it.
(Weiss 436) Yet, upon closer examina-
tion, it becomes apparent that the root of
the problem was the success of the funda-
mentalists in cultivating popular support
and the corresponding failure of the mod-
ernists to counter it. As Pakistan entered
the industrial age, economic and political
power had begun to shift away from the
landed class that constituted the modern-
ists. They found themselves no longer
able to effect their goals through status-
based influence and prestige.
Decline of the modernists
Despite attempts at reform, the distri-
bution of wealth, power and educational
resources in Pakistan remains remarkably
lopsided. Nearly one in ten infants die at
birth and half the population does not
have safe drinking water. (Stackhouse,
1992b: A9) Ironically, the modernist sup-
port fordemocracy gradually undermined
its status-based source of power. (Rouse
54) However, a large educated middle-
class, sympathetic to modernist views,
has not emerged. (Mumtaz & Shaheed
158) Instead, the power and influence of
the old pro-modernist landed class has
been replaced by that of a small new
industrial elite. Today, 22 industrial fami-
lies own 66 per cent of the country's
wealth. (Mumtaz & Shaheed 140) Having
acceded to economic power, these men,
who own cellular phones and meet with
foreign investors in five star hotels, are
amassing political power as well. Unfor-
tunately, this new elite, with its roots in
rural culture, believes that its interests are
better served through support of funda-
mentalist and not modernist causes.
The women's movement began over 80
years ago as a small but influential group
composed of women from the Western-
educated landed class. Although it now
includes some professional women, its
composition remains largely unchanged.
(Rouse 56) For example, many of the
present members of the Women's Action
Forum (WAF) come from third or fourth
generation activist families. (Mumtaz and
Shaheed 152) Like the modernist move-
ment that they are a part of, women's
organizations have failed to infiltrate the
elite industrialists or the country's poor.
As a result, while some women have risen
to positions of influence, Benazir Bhutto
being an obviousexample, the majority of
Pakistani women remain silenced and se-
cluded. As one female officer of the pres-
tigious foreign service put it: "we know
we are only 0.000 something of a percent
of Pakistani women (and) that makes us
feel guilty." (Crossette, 1990a: A5) The
political and religiousconvictionsofthese
women are removed from those of the
majority and with the decline of their
collective power and influence, the move-
ment's strength has greatly diminished.
Without its modernist allies in govem-
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ment, the women's movement, as it is
presently composed, can no longer deter
regressive legislation, let alone realize
positive change. Consequently, to regain
and surpass its former influence, it needs
desperately to broaden its support base.
Regaining ground-a strategy for the
future
The difficulties and dangers entailed in
broadening support for the women's
movement mean that it will be necessary
for it to remain well within the framework
of Islam. Unlike the landed class, the new
industrial, middle and lower classes did
not integrate with the British socially and
intellectually. They were not exposed to
Western ideology historically, and have
been unlikely, until recently, to come into
contact with modem media or education
because of linguistic, cultural, and eco-
nomic barriers. Religion remains pivotal
in their lives and their peers'. Subse-
quently, unlike earlier activists, who en-
joyed support from their families, women
from these classes will be subject to criti-
cism and disapproval. Furthermore, they
will be susceptible to public scorn and
abuse because they lack family prestige
and connections to shield them. Without
the legitimizing rhetoric of Islam the risk
to these women would simply be too
great
Now, more than ever, it will be essen-
tial to adhere to a very moderate modern-
ist approach so as to appeal to a broader
spectrum of Pakistani society. There are
other advantages to employing the mod-
erate view: Islam is a powerful mobilizing
force that evokes nationalist pride, and it
should not be left to the exclusive domain
of fundamentalists. Islam can legitimize
rights and achievements of women that
might otherwise be dismissed as Western
and alien. If support can be found in
religious scripture for reform, then
progress is more probable and advocates
will be less likely to be accused of heresy.
By working within Islam, yetpromoting a
moderate modernist agenda, women's
groups can best mitigate fundamentalist
antagonism.
At the same time, external cultural in-
fluences have already transformed the
consciousness of some Pakistani women
and men and contributed to an expecta-
tion of institutionalized gender equality;
this notion is slowly precipitating through
class barriers. (Rafi, 1990: 18) Perhaps
the legacy of Benazir's time in office will
be her bold decision to allow Cable News
Network (CNN) to be relayed to Pakistan,
thus bringing the world to remote vil-
lages. (Crossette, 1990b: A20) Interna-
tional human rights law standards have
long been embraced by the women's
movement's strong leadership, but they
must now gradually be integrated with the
political, economic and social realities of
most Pakistanis' lives.
The women's movement must make
the best of this period of fundamentalist
strength byeliciting support from the many
women whose suffering has increased.
Because the movement is no longer a part
of the economic and political elite, it must
employ new methods of influencing gov-
ernment policy. Whereas past attempts to
improve women's legal status directly
through law reform have met with some
success, they ultimately led to the move-
ment's decline because the gap between
law and societal values became too great.
Before the women's movement can suc-
cessfully challenge the nation's discrimi-
natory laws, it must win the support of the
people. As it does so, it will be increas-
ingly able to influence governmentpolicy
through public opinion and to effect long-
lasting legal reform. In the meantime, it
must put aside the hope for rapid legal
reform and be content with modest ad-
vances while it rebuilds strength in ailtici-
pation of future legal challenges.
NanBerezowski is a third year student at
Osgoode Hall Law School. She has a
long-standing interest in the political and
religious issues affecting Pakistani
women. In 1990. she travelled extensively
throughout Pakistan.
1 Ayub Kahn ruled Pakistan from 1958-
1969 under martial law. Bhutto was in
power from 1970-1977; he was popularly
elected.
2 Bhutto was ousted by a military coup
and sentenced to death by his oppo-
nents.
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